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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah

Code

Ann.

Section

78-2a-3(2)(j)

gives

this

Court

jurisdiction over this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues on appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court commit error in granting summary-

judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint, ruling that Plaintiff
failed

to provide

any

admissible

evidence

of

ownership

of

a

pipeline which Plaintiff claims was wrongfully used by Defendants?
2.

Should the Plaintiff be allowed, first by a motion to

reconsider after the entry of summary judgment and then on appeal,
to change its theories, submit new documents and claim rights under
an agreement signed after the claimed damages occurred?
3.

Are other owners of the pipeline indispensable parties to

a claim of trespass of the pipeline?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, the Court follows
a correctness standard. Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharm., Inc.,
2003 UT 43, Hl4, 79 P.3d 922.
A motion to reconsider is not recognized by the court. A trial
court ruling on a motion to reconsider is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. Radakovich v. Cornaby, 2006 UT App 454, ^[5,
147 P.3d 1195; Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins., 2007 UT 37, Kl5, 163
P.3d 615.

1

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 19. See Addendum A.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56. See Addendum B.
Utah R. Civ. P. 59. See Addendum C.
Utah R. Evid. 1002.
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph,
the
original
writing,
recording,
or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in
these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court of this State or by Statute.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

trial court granted

summary judgment, dismissing

the

Plaintiff's Complaint seeking trespass damages for using a pipeline
to transport small quantities of natural gas. The court found that
Plaintiff had provided no proof of the allegations in Plaintiff's
Complaint. Plaintiff's complaint, filed in February 2005, claimed
damages in trespass beginning in 2001 for Defendants' use of the
pipeline based on a claim that the Plaintiff was the sole owner of
the pipeline.1
The Complaint alleges in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 as
follows:
7.
The subject of this lawsuit is the unauthorized
use of approximately 4 miles of a natural gas pipeline
and easement, which runs in an east/west direction and

That allegation in the complaint has never been amended.
However, Plaintiff has taken various other positions in this case,
including admitting that others owned the pipeline and now, on
appeal, claiming a possessory interest in the pipeline.
2

has a total length of approximately 8 miles, located in
the North Bonanza field, in Section 36, Township 7 South,
Range 24 East, Section 31, Township 7 South, Range 25
East, Sections 6 and 7, Township 8 South, Range 25 East,
and Sections 12,13, 23, 24, 26, and 27, Township 8 South,
Range 24 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, Uintah County,
Utah (hereinafter the "Pipeline").
8.

Plaintiff is the current owner of the Pipeline.

9.
During the times of the unauthorized use of the
Pipeline, which unauthorized use is the subject of this
litigation, the Pipeline was owned by either the
Plaintiff or by Mr. William C. Gilmore, who resides in
Houston, Texas, or by other business entities owned or
controlled by Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Gilmore and the other
business entities mentioned in the previous sentence are
collectively
referred
to
herein
as
"Plaintiff's
Predecessors
in
Interest"
or
as
"Plaintiff's
Predecessors."
10. Mr. Gilmore is the president and controlling
shareholder of the Plaintiff.
11. Plaintiff has sole right to pursue, and the
sole ownership of, the claims hereby presented by
assignment from Mr. Gilmore and the other business
entities referenced in the previous paragraph.
(R. 11-12) .
Mr. Gilmore testified in his deposition2 that Bonanza Gas
built and owned the pipeline at issue in this matter. (Gilmore Dep.
at 95, 96, R. 479). Mr. Gilmore further attested that Bonanza Gas
was

either

a

partnership

with

seven

or

eight

partners

or

a

For the Court's convenience, pages from Mr. Gilmore's
deposition, submitted to the trial court prior to summary judgment
and referred to in this brief, are attached in the addendum. Page
18 of the (summary judgment) oral argument transcript is also
attached. That page contains quotations from pages 14 5 and 14 6 of
Mr. Gilmore's deposition testimony. Following citations to these
pages, their location in the record is specified, and references to
other supporting materials in the record are supplied.
3

corporation with multiple shareholders. (Gilmore Dep. at 10-11, 13,
15, 93-94, R. 223, 225, 227-28, 479).3 In addition, Mr. Gilmore
averred that Ted Collins Jr. (Gilmore Dep. at 114, 151-52, R. 332334),

Herbert

E. Ware, Jr. and

Houston

Exploration

Company

(hereinafter referred to as "Houston Exploration") owned interests
in the pipeline. (Gilmore Dep. at 86, 112, 114, 151-52, R. 331335) . In his

deposition,

Mr. Gilmore

denied

that

Plaintiff

represented the interests of Houston Exploration, Ted Collins Jr.
and Herbert E. Ware, Jr. (Gilmore Dep. at 112, Transcript of oral
argument at 18 quoting Gilmore Dep. at 145-46, R. 335, 901).
All Defendants denied the allegations that Plaintiff owned the
pipeline at the time for which it claimed damages, or had the right
to recover for use of the pipeline. (R. 17-18, 34-35, 43-45). In
part, these denials were made because it was known that the
pipeline, and other assets associated with it, had been the subject
of

a

receivership

involving

Bonanza

Gas,

under

which

Ken

Allen/Cochrane Resources had been appointed by the court to operate
the pipeline, and that revenues gained from its operation had been
used to pay expenses of operating the pipeline and repairs to it.
(Gilmore Dep. at 85-87, 102, 152, R. 330-332, 480) . Mr. Gilmore, in
his deposition, admitted that the pipeline had been operated by
Cochrane Resources under court order. (Gilmore Dep. at 86, 102,
3

Documentation submitted by Plaintiff after the trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment showed that Bonanza Gas was
a Texas Corporation. (R. 584).
4

152, R. 330-332) . The documents provided by Plaintiff by attachment
to its Motion to Reconsider show that Cochrane Resources paid the
rental payments to the BLM on the pipeline right-of-way for the
years 2002 through 2005. (R. 609-619). Bonanza Gas was billed for
the BLM easement rental in 2001. (R. 604, 606-607).
The defendants attempted to conduct discovery to determine
what

evidence

existed

to

support

Weststar's

allegations

that

Weststar owned the pipeline at the time of the alleged trespass.
Weststar was asked repeatedly for evidence supporting Weststar's
allegations

that

it was

the owner of

the pipeline. The

only

information provided was Mr. Gilmore's claim that he became the
owner of the pipeline by virtue of an unrecorded assignment from
Bonanza Gas and then he transferred the interest to Weststar.
(Gilmore Dep. at 33, R. 481, 358-365, 371, 417). Despite numerous
requests and promises, Plaintiff never produced the "unrecorded
assignment'' from Bonanza Gas to Mr. Gilmore. In Appellant's brief,
that position has changed to a claim that Mr. Gilmore obtained
title to the pipeline by virtue of being a shareholder of Bonanza
Gas.
Weststar never provided any admissible evidence to support its
allegations that Plaintiff had title to the pipeline and sole right
to use the pipeline as alleged in its Complaint. All admissible
evidence showed the pipeline was owned by Bonanza Gas, which was

5

not a party to the case. The trial court, therefore, granted
summary judgment dismissing the complaint. (R. 533, 537).
More than a month after the court granted summary judgment,
Plaintiff filed its Motion to Reconsider, attempting to change its
theories and attaching documents that it had never produced in
discovery. (R. 668) . The motion and documents were not proper and,
in addition, did not strengthen the Plaintiff's claim, but rather
showed ownership of the pipeline by Bonanza Gas. The documents
further showed that the pipeline was operated during the time in
question by Cochrane Resources under the receivership order. The
trial court denied the motion to reconsider. (R. 834).
Course of Proceedings and Facts
1.

Weststar filed its Complaint on or about February 9,

2005. Plaintiff's complaint sought damages for trespass, claiming
sole ownership of the pipeline from 2001 to 2005. (R. 3-12).
2.

The pipeline is located on a BLM easement in Uintah

County, Utah and is subject to the permit terms of the BLM. It is
alleged that Defendants used 4 miles of the pipeline to transport
small quantities of gas from Chevron and QEP to operate equipment
on certain gas wells. (R. 10).
3.

The parties held a telephone attorneys' planning meeting

on June 29, 2005. The Scheduling Order memorializing the deadlines
in the Report of Attorneys' Planning Meeting was signed by the
court on July 22, 2005. (R. 112). Under the discovery plan, the

6

parties were to submit their initial disclosures to each other by
July 22, 2005, and complete fact discovery by October 31, 2005. (R.
112) .
4.

All parties in the case, except Weststar, submitted their

initial disclosures to all other parties by the July 22, 2005
deadline.

(R. 30-31, 39-40). Plaintiff never filed its initial

disclosures until the court granted a motion to compel. (R. 13 5138) .
5.

The failure of Plaintiff to meet the deadline for initial

disclosures
throughout
discovery

marked
this

the

beginning

litigation,

deadlines,

of

whereby

failed

to

a

pattern

Plaintiff

provide

that

failed

documents

lasted
to meet

and

other

information when requested by the other parties (and agreed to by
Weststar) and otherwise failed to prosecute this action.
6.

After numerous attempts, the parties took the deposition

of Plaintiff's president, Mr. Gilmore, on October 3, 2005.
7.

Gilmore testified, in his deposition, that he formed

Bonanza Gas Company sometime in the early 1990s. (Gilmore Dep. at
10-11,

13-16,

R.

222-225, 227-228).

Bonanza

Gas

obtained

the

easement for the pipeline from the BLM and owned, constructed and
operated the pipeline. (R. 598).
8.

Gilmore testified that he had an unrecorded assignment of

ownership of the pipeline from Bonanza Gas to himself personally,
and

an

unrecorded

assignment

of

7

ownership

from

himself

to

Plaintiff. He and his attorney agreed to produce those documents to
all counsel. He did provide a form Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases
from himself

to Weststar that might be construed to include a

pipeline, but he never produced any assignment from Bonanza Gas.
(Gilmore Dep. at 34, R. 220).
9.

Gilmore also testified that Weststar had assigned a fifty

(50%) percent

interest

in the pipeline

Company on March 26, 2004.

to Houston

Exploration

(Gilmore Dep. at 112, R. 335). He

further testified that two individuals with whom Gilmore has a long
history of litigation, Ted Collins and Herbert Ware, Jr., each had
a longstanding 8.33% ownership interest in the pipeline. (Gilmore
Dep. at 114, R. 334). Weststar did not claim to represent the
interests of Houston Exploration, Collins or Ware. (Transcript of
oral argument at 18 quoting Gilmore Dep. at 145-4 6, R. 901).
10.

Gilmore further admitted that, from 2002 into 2005, the

pipeline and other assets were operated by Cochrane Resources (one
of the defendants) under a court order. (Gilmore Dep. at 86, R.
331) .
11.
of

When Plaintiff failed to produce any admissible evidence

ownership

judgment.

The

of

the

motions

pipeline,
were

Defendants

briefed

and

moved

the

for

court

summary

held

oral

argument.
12.

The primary issue at oral argument and in the motions for

summary judgment was Plaintiff's lack of any admissible evidence

8

that it, rather than Bonanza Gas, owned the pipeline. (Transcript
of oral argument at 12, 48, 50, R. 901) . Plaintiff attached, to its
memorandum in opposition to Cochrane Resources, Inc.'s summary
judgment motion, a 1988 operating agreement between Gilmore Oil and
Gas

as

operator

and

several

nonoperating

parties.

(R. 453).

Plaintiff, at oral argument, produced agreements between Plaintiff
and Houston Exploration to which Defendants objected. (Transcript
of oral argument

at 30, R.

901) . Plaintiff

argued that those

documents gave Plaintiff title to the pipeline. It was pointed out
that the 198 8 agreement predated the construction of the pipeline
by 3 years, that Bonanza Gas was not a party to either agreement,
that Mr. Gilmore had earlier testified that Bonanza operated the
pipeline and that Gilmore Oil and Gas operated certain wells.
(Gilmore Dep. at 11, R. 227, Transcript of oral argument at 25, R.
901) .
13.
Plaintiff

The
had

court
failed

granted
to

summary

provide

any

judgment,

finding that

admissible

evidence

of

ownership of the pipeline as alleged in the complaint. (R. 533,
537) .
14.
Plaintiff
attached

More than a month after entry of the summary judgment,
filed a document
numerous

documents

it titled Motion to Reconsider and
that

it had

failed

to produce

in

discovery. Plaintiff alleged that the newly produced documents
showed that Plaintiff owned the pipeline. (R. 668).

9

15.

The trial court denied that motion. (R. 834).

16.

Plaintiff, on appeal, has changed its theory and no

longer claims ownership based on the never produced unrecorded
assignment claimed by Mr. Gilmore, but instead alleges that Gilmore
acquired the pipeline by operation of law as a shareholder of
Bonanza or that Plaintiff had a possessory right to the pipeline
based on the operating agreement and a participation agreement
between Plaintiff and Houston Exploration.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Weststar had numerous requests and opportunities to provide
proof of the ownership of the pipeline as alleged in the complaint.
All evidence and the documents it provided show the pipeline was
owned by Bonanza Gas Company, Inc. Weststar's president claimed
that he had documentary proof

(an unrecorded assignment) and

repeatedly promised to supply it. He failed to do so and then, at
oral argument, claimed a right to the pipeline under a 1988
operating

agreement

and

the

Houston

Exploration

financing

documents. Now, on appeal, Plaintiff's position has changed again,
claiming either that Mr. Gilmore acquired the pipeline by operation
of law, alleging that Bonanza was dissolved, or that Plaintiff has
a possessory right under the terms of the agreements with Houston
Exploration.4 Those theories were never raised before the trial

4

Plaintiff, in its brief, also improperly attempts to include
parts of the deposition transcript that were not before the trial
10

court on the motion for summary judgment and never ruled on by the
court below.
Regardless

of

the

shifting

of

Plaintiff's

positions, the

record stands uncontradicted that Bonanza Gas owns the pipeline.
There has been no admissible evidence showing any transfer of that
ownership. For several years, 2 002-20 05, operation of that pipeline
was transferred to Cochrane Resources under a court order. Not
until 2006 did the BLM authorize Plaintiff to operate the line,
which date was well after any claimed damages occurred.
The additional documents submitted by Weststar in its Motion
to Reconsider, after the motions for summary judgment had been
granted, should not be considered on appeal. However, even if they
are, they establish that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION BY ADDING NEW DOCUMENTS AND NEW THEORIES
ON APPEAL,
Weststar apparently agrees that the trial court's grant of
summary judgment was correct based on the record at the time of the
ruling, because Weststar is now attempting to overturn the trial
court's decision by first seeking to add new documents (that were
never produced in discovery but rather through an improper motion

court. See Appellant's brief at footnote 9.
11

to reconsider) to the record, and then by arguing that it did not
have to show ownership but only a "possessory

interest" in the

pipeline.5 This theory was not pled and was not raised nor argued
in connection with the motions for summary judgment in the court
below.
Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Rules of Civil
Procedure and are not recognized by the courts. Gillett v. Price,
2006 UT 24, %1, 135 P.3d 861; Radakovich, 2006 UT App 454, %%5, 13;
Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, f 15. The trial court has discretion on
whether to consider a motion to reconsider and the trial court's
ruling will only be reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard.
Id. at 1J16. Issues not before the court when it rules on a motion
for summary judgment are waived and may not be raised later by
motions to reconsider or on appeal. Eldridae v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT
App 243, t 33, 166 P.3d 639; Hanover v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751, 753
(Utah 1977); Battistone v. Am. Land & Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837, 838
(Utah 1980).
In addition, it is established law that one cannot put forth
"new" evidence after entry of the judgment unless that evidence is
"newly discovered" and the proponent "could not, with reasonable
diligence discover it prior to oral argument." Utah R. Civ. P.

5

Right to possess generally arises from ownership of the
property. Qwest v. Utah Telecomm. Open Structure Agency, No. 2:05CV-00471 (D. Utah July 18, 2006) at 12 (attached in addendum);
Butler v. Pollard, 800 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1986).
12

59(a)(4); Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235

(Utah 1992).

Furthermore,
when a party takes a clear position in a deposition, that
is not modified on cross-examination, [the party] may not
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his [or her] own
affidavit which contradicts the evidence from the
deposition, unless [the party] can provide an explanation
of the discrepancy. A contrary rule would undermine the
utility of summary judgment as a means for screening out
sham issues of fact.
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73

(Utah 1983); Gaboury v.

Ireland Rd. Graco Brethren, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 1310 (Ind. 1983).
Weststar's complaint alleged, and its position below was, that
it

owned

the

pipeline

through

an

unrecorded

and

unproduced

assignment from Bonanza Gas to Mr. Gilmore, who in turn assigned
ownership to Weststar Exploration Company.6 (R. 3 ) . Weststar should
not be allowed, for the first time on appeal, to submit records
from the BLM, by attaching them to an improper motion to reconsider
and then to change its position to claim that it had a possessory

6

The assignment from Gilmore to Weststar has its own set of
problems. The document was apparently signed in December 2003 and
then recorded in the county recorder's office on March 31, 2004.
(R. 3 65) . In an attempt to bootstrap an argument of legitimacy back
to the date of the alleged injury in the complaint, the assignment
states that, although dated 2003 and recorded in 2004, it is
effective January 1, 2000. (R. 363-365). Thus, through this
assignment, Weststar would have the Court believe that the pipeline
was assigned to Weststar before Weststar was even created as a
corporation. (Gilmore Dep. at 93, R. 479) . The Nevada corporate
records show Weststar was not incorporated until August 9, 2000. A
conveyance to a nonexistent entity is a nullity. Young v. Young,
1999 UT 38, 1[22, 9 7 9 p - 2 d 3 3 8 13

right to the pipeline as operator, under an operating agreement,
rather than ownership as alleged in its complaint.
A.

PLAINTIFF PROVIDED NO EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO SUPPORT ITS
ALLEGATION THAT IT OWNED THE PIPELINE.

The motions for summary judgment were based on Weststar's
claim that it owned the pipeline, as alleged in the complaint and
as claimed by Mr. Gilmore

in his deposition. Despite numerous

requests by Defendants and promises by Plaintiff, Plaintiff never
produced the unrecorded assignment Mr. Gilmore claimed he had in
his office showing the transfer of title from Bonanza Gas. If such
a document exists, Plaintiff needed only to produce the same in
response to the motions for summary judgment.
When Weststar
Motions

for

filed

Summary

its Memorandum

Judgment,

it

in Opposition

attached

to

Mr.

to

the

Gilmore 7 s

affidavit a form Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases from Mr. Gilmore
to Weststar, (R. 365) , and attached to one of its memoranda a Model
Form Operating Agreement, dated June 22, 198 8, between Gilmore Oil
and Gas as operator and W. Brett Smith, C.O. Ted Collins, Harry
Phillips, Jr., Herbert E. Ware, Jr., Eddy Refining Company, Charles
Parker and Lowe Petroleum Company as non operators.7

(R. 431).

Neither Bonanza Gas nor Weststar was a party to that agreement. (R.

7

Gilmore in his deposition testified that Gilmore Oil and Gas
operated certain wells and that Bonanza owned and operated the
pipeline. (Gilmore Dep. at 11, R. 227.)
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423-453). At the oral argument on the summary judgment motions,
Plaintiff delivered a Participation Agreement, dated March 1, 2004,
between Weststar and Houston Exploration and a Model Form Operating
Agreement between Weststar and Houston Exploration. None of those
documents shows any transfer of the pipeline from Bonanza Gas nor
do they give to Weststar any ownership or possessory rights.
The 198 8 operating agreement was dated three years prior to
the construction of the pipeline, Bonanza Gas was not a party to
the agreement and Mr. Gilmore testified that Gilmore Oil and Gas
operated the wells and Bonanza Gas operated the pipeline. The
documents involving Houston Exploration were part of the financing
between Weststar and Houston Exploration but involved no transfer
of ownership from Bonanza Gas.
B.

THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER
ALSO DID NOT TRANSFER ANY OF BONANZA GAS'S
INTEREST, BUT RATHER SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO
RIGHT UNDER THE BLM PROCEDURES TO OPERATE THE LINE
UNTIL 2006.

After the court granted summary judgment, Weststar tried to
improve its argument by attaching documents to a motion titled
Motion for Reconsideration. The new documents attached to that
motion included BLM receipts

showing Bonanza Gas and

Cochrane

Resources being the operators and paying the lease payments on the
easement during the time period in question,

(R. 601-628), the

right-of-way permit issued to Bonanza Gas in 1991 for the pipeline,
(R. 597-598), documents submitted by Bonanza Gas to obtain the
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right-of-way, (R. 586-595), Certificate of Incorporation showing
Bonanza Gas was incorporated in Texas in December 1990, (R. 584),
a Decision of the BLM approving an assignment to Weststar from
Bonanza Gas of the right-of-way on March 13, 2006, (R. 579), and a
letter from the BLM to Plaintiff dated June 8, 2004. (R. 547).
This new evidence (NOT "newly discovered evidence") had been
seen neither by the court nor by any of the defendants before the
Motion for Reconsideration (and not for the lack of asking). None
of the defendants had the opportunity to examine Mr. Gilmore with
regard to these documents. In addition, they were not used in
support of Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motions for
summary judgment, nor were they provided, at the very least, at
oral argument so that the court could consider them as part of
Weststar's arguments in opposition to Defendants' motions for
summary judgment. The documents should not be considered by this
Court. Those documents should have been "discovered and produced"
prior to the motions for summary judgment as required by the
scheduling order. (R. 112).
Even if the Court considers these documents, they do not
support Plaintiff's claim, and, in fact, contradict Mr. Gilmore's
testimony at his deposition, that Weststar was the owner of the
pipeline. The documents show that Bonanza Gas had the BLM permit
for the right-of-way, that Bonanza Gas and Cochrane Resources
operated the pipeline from 2001 to 2005, and that Plaintiff was
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told in the June 8, 2004 letter that an assignment and subsequent
approval by the BLM were required to allow Plaintiff to operate the
pipeline. That approval was not given until March 2006, well after
any claim for damages.8

(See June 2004 and March 2006

letters

attached in addendum.)
C.

GILMORE'S ASSERTION IN HIS AFFIDAVIT THAT BONANZA
GAS ASSIGNED THE PIPELINE TO HIM IS NOT ADMISSIBLE,
AND APPARENTLY ABANDONED,
BASED ON THE NEW
ARGUMENTS.

The only remaining claim by Plaintiff to support its position
is

the

statement

in Mr.

Gilmore's

affidavit

that

he

had

an

unrecorded assignment of the pipeline from Bonanza Gas. Mr. Gilmore
never presented the document establishing the assignment, despite
numerous promises to do so. It has become apparent that no such
assignment exists, as he has now changed his position on that claim
and is relying on other documents that were attached to the motion
to reconsider. Gilmore's affidavit statement violates Rule 1002 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Additionally, the statement is barred
by Utah law because it involves an alleged assignment of a real
property interest that must be in writing to meet the statute of
frauds. The statement is not admissible as evidence and should not
be considered. Mountain W. Surgical Ctr. v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah,
2007 UT 92, 592 Utah Adv. Rep. 23.

8

The BLM Decision references an assignment from Bonanza Gas to
Plaintiff but no such assignment was provided in the additional
documents.
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The court correctly granted the motions for summary judgment,
because Weststar either could not, or declined to, provide evidence
to

raise

a

genuine

issue

of

material

fact

establishing

its

ownership of the pipeline at the time the court ruled on the
motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff's belated attempts to cure
that problem evince only that any right Plaintiff had to operate,
possess or use the pipeline did not begin until March 2006, when
the BLM approved Plaintiff as the operator.
POINT II
THE DOCUMENTS BETWEEN HOUSTON EXPLORATION AND WESTSTAR
FROM 2 005 DO NOT CREATE A POSSESSORY RIGHT TO AN INTEREST
IN THE PIPELINE, SINCE THE PIPELINE WAS OWNED BY BONANZA
GAS, NOT WESTSTAR.
Bonanza Gas built the pipeline in question in 1991. Bonanza
Gas was a Texas corporation. It apparently had seven or eight
shareholders. (Gilmore Dep. at 93-94, R. 479). At the trial court,
Plaintiff, through its president, claimed that the chain of title
from Bonanza Gas to Weststar consisted of an unrecorded, unproduced
and apparently nonexistent assignment signed by Mr. Gilmore on
behalf of Bonanza Gas to Mr. Gilmore. (Gilmore Dep. at 34, 95, R.
220, 479) . None of the other seven or eight shareholders in Bonanza
Gas is a party to the alleged assignment to Mr. Gilmore. (Gilmore
Dep.

at

According

10-11,

13, 15,

94, 96, R.

223, 225,

227-228, 479).

to Mr. Gilmore, the date of this alleged unrecorded

assignment is sometime in 2005, the same year as the filing of this
lawsuit. (Gilmore Dep. at 95, R. 4 79). This unproduced assignment
18

was made after the damages are alleged (in the complaint) to have
occurred.
Since that assignment does not exist or has not been supplied,
Plaintiff claims that it has a right to bring this lawsuit because
it has a right to possession in, rather than ownership of, the
pipeline. This alleged right to possession is predicated on a
belatedly produced Participation Agreement in which it purported to
sell an interest in the pipeline to Houston Exploration, and an
Operating Agreement between Weststar and Houston Exploration making
Weststar the operator. Plaintiff makes that claim, but neither
provides anything evidencing a transfer of title or possession from
Bonanza Gas nor points to anything in the documents to support the
claim.
Plaintiff's theory appears to be that a person can sell an
interest in a pipeline which he does not own, and then enter into
an agreement with the buyer giving him, the non-owner seller, the
right to possess it. Indeed, these transactions were completed
while

the buyer's president

claims

that other parties owned

interests in the pipeline, and those parties are not signatories to
either agreement. One cannot give oneself rights one does not have
by purportedly conveying such non-existent rights to another and
then acquiring them back from the other. Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P. 2d
1044, 1046 (Utah 1987); Julian v. Peterson, 966 P.2d 878 (Ut. Ct.
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App. 1998); Am. Vending Serv. Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1994).
POINT III
WESTSTAR'S NEW CLAIM THAT GILMORE RECEIVED TITLE TO THE
PIPELINE BY VIRTUE OF THE DISSOLUTION OF BONANZA GAS BY
OPERATION OF THE LAW IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND
IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW REGARDING CORPORATE
DISSOLUTION.
Apparently conceding that there is no assignment from Bonanza
Gas to Mr. Gilmore, Plaintiff for the first time on appeal argues
that Mr. Gilmore obtained title to the pipeline by virtue of the
dissolution of Bonanza Gas by operation of
statute

and

cases

for

the

proposition

that

law, citing
the

Texas

assets

of

a

dissolved company belong to the shareholders. Nothing in the record
demonstrates that Bonanza was dissolved, nor is there information
as to the number of shareholders. In addition, Weststar omits
reference

to the

law

that, when there

is a dissolution of

a

company, creditors and taxes must be satisfied before shareholders
have any right to the assets of the dissolved company.
In other words, after any dissolution, there is a liquidation
of the corporate assets in which the debts are paid according to
their

rights

and

priorities.

If,

and

only

if,

assets

remain

available after all corporate liabilities are paid, assets are then
distributed

to

shareholders

according

to

their

rights

and

priorities. The distribution of assets to shareholders is evidenced
by conveyances appropriate to the type of asset. Further, all
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shareholders

are

shares. Gilmore

distributed
apparently

assets

based

owned only

on

their number

8.33% of

of

the shares of

Bonanza Gas. (Gilmore Dep. at 10-11, R. 227-228). Even the Texas
case

cited by Weststar

in support of

its argument

is a case

involving a deed conveying assets of a dissolved corporation, and
demonstrates that, until the liquidation takes place and there is
a distribution of assets by conveyance, it is unknown whether and
which assets go to which shareholders of a dissolved corporation.
Until

the liquidation and the distribution by conveyance, the

assets remain with record title in the corporation. Since Weststar
produced no evidence explaining if and how the assets of Bonanza
Gas were distributed and there was no claim before the trial court
of any such liquidation, the trial court correctly ruled that
neither Gilmore nor Weststar owned the pipeline.
POINT IV
WESTSTAR'S NEW POSSESSORY CLAIMS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENTS (i.e.,
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT
AND OPERATING AGREEMENT AND BLM RECORDS) ON WHICH THOSE
CLAIMS ARE BASED.
While Weststar
allegations

that

failed to present evidence

it is the sole owner of

to support

the pipeline

its

or to

contradict the documents it produced showing others to be owners
and

has

changed

its

argument,

that

new

argument

regarding

possession still does not defeat the granting of summary judgment
against it. Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that
Plaintiff's new claims are accurate and that the defects in the
21

chain of title do not thwart Plaintiff's claims, and the Court
further overlooks that Plaintiff's argument is based on evidence
that was available but not produced at the time of the original
briefing, not newly discovered evidence, Defendants are still
entitled

to

summary

judgment.

The

newly

produced

Operating

Agreement does not support Plaintiff's claim.
Weststar's claim of a right of possession to bring this action
by virtue of being the operator under the operating agreement with
Houston Exploration Company is not supported by the language of
that agreement. The agreement provides that the "Operator shall not
be deemed or hold itself out as the agent of the Non-Operator with
authority to bind them to any obligation or liability assumed or
incurred by Operator as to any third party." (Article V Operating
Agreement, R. 7 82).
The operator under this agreement is Weststar. The only nonoperator to sign the agreement is Houston Exploration Company. A
reading of the operating agreement does not reveal any language
authorizing the operator to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the
parties to the agreement, much less can it provide authority to
bring an action for non-parties such as Ted Collins and H. Ware.
The

narrow

authorization

for

lawsuits

mentioned

in the

operating agreement pertains to lawsuits giving the operator
authority to
settle any single uninsured third party damage claim or
suit arising from operations hereunder if the expenditure
22

does not exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and if
the payment is complete settlement on such claim or suit.
If the amount required for settlement exceeds the above
amount ($10,000.00), the parties hereto shall assume and
take over the further handling of the claim or suit
unless such authority is delegated to operator.
(Article X Operating Agreement, R. 772).
First, the lawsuit before the Court does not arise from the
operations "hereunder" (the operations authorized by the operating
agreement). Second, the lawsuit is not a third party uninsured
claim. Third, the lawsuit seeks to recover more than Ten Thousand
Dollars. Finally, the alleged claim for damages involves claimed
actions for years before the operating agreement was in existence.
Paragraphs 13 and 19 of Weststar's Complaint both allege that
trespass started in 2001 and continued through 2004. The operating
agreement does not support Plaintiff's claim.
POINT V
EVEN IF THE COURT FOUND THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN
DISPUTE REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S OWNERSHIP/POSSESSION OF THE
PIPELINE, THE CASE SHOULD STILL BE DISMISSED UNTIL THE
PLAINTIFF ADDS ALL PARTIES CLAIMING OWNERSHIP/POSSESSION OF
THE PIPELINE,
One of the issues raised by the motions for summary judgment
was a claim that the case should be dismissed unless all parties
claiming

ownership/possession

parties.

(R.

287). If

Bonanza

of

the

Gas

pipeline

was

not

were

added

the owner

of

as
the

pipeline, then there are eight to ten entities and individuals that
claim an interest in this pipeline including Houston Exploration,
Ted Collins, H. Ware, W. Brett Smith, Harry Phillips, Eddy Refining
23

Co., Charles Parker, Lowe Petroleum, and Peter Wareing. (R. 556).
If Plaintiff somehow acquired an interest from Bonanza Gas, that
interest

is probably

less than

6.25%.9

Plaintiff

has

provided

nothing that illustrates it has the right to sue for trespass on
behalf

of all these parties, and,

in fact, Mr. Gilmore, when

questioned specifically about some of the parties, testified that
Plaintiff was not representing those parties. (Gilmore Dep. at 112,
152, Transcript of oral argument at 18 quoting Gilmore Dep. at 14 546, R. 332, 335, 901). If there has been a trespass and damage to
the pipeline, those entities are entitled to their percentage of
any damages and Defendants are at risk if all parties having a
claim are not included in the case.
The trial court ruled:
[S]upposing the Plaintiff were able to prove even a
partial ownership, the other putative co-owners of the
pipeline should have been joined in this suit pursuant to
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to
join these parties could also be grounds for dismissal,
albeit without prejudice. However because the Plaintiff
has not proven any ownership of the pipeline at all, this
Court does not have to explore that avenue.
(R. 533-536) .
If this Court believes that Plaintiff has a right to seek
damages and remands the case to the trial court, the Court should
order Plaintiff to add as parties all entities that may have a

9

The 1988 Operating Agreement lists Gilmore7s interest as
12.25% and one half of that interest was conveyed to Houston
Exploration.
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claim to ownership/possession of the pipeline. Utah R. Civ. P.
19(a); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Utah 1984).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request
that the trial

court's decision granting

summary

judgment for

Defendants be affirmed.
Dated this JZ~^» day of January, 2008.
McKEACHNIE LAW OFFICES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
Newfield Rocky Mountains,
Inc. fka Inland Resources, Inc. and
QEP Uinta Basin, Inc.

By:

A ^ j ^ ^ ^ ^
Gayle ^ . McKeachnie

ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys/for Defendants/Appellees
Cochrane/Respurces, Inc., and
P & M Peftro]/eum Management, LLC.

By: _
ClArk
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ADDENDUM
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)
F)
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Utah R. Civ. P. 19
Utah R. Civ. P. 56
Utah R. Civ. P. 59
Ruling (August 3, 2006)
Order of Summary Judgment (August 23, 2006)
Ruling and Order (November 8, 2006)
Excerpts from Oral Argument Transcript and William
Gilmore's Deposition
H) Qwest v. Utah Telecomm. Open Structure Agency, No. 2:05CV-00471 (D. Utah July 18, 2006)
I) June 8, 2004 and March 13, 2006 letters from the BLM
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Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined

if

feasible.

A person who is subject to

service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as
a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he
has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a
party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he
may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff. If the joinded party objects to venue and his joinder
would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination

by court

whenever joinder

not

feasible.

If a

person as described in Subdivision (a) (l)-(2) hereof cannot be made
a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it,
or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as
indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading

reasons

for nonjoinder.

A pleading asserting a claim

for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any
persons as described in Subdivision (a) (1)- (2) hereof who are not
joined, and the reasons why they are not joined,
(d) Exception
of class
provisions of Rule 23.

actions.

This rule is subject to the
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Rule 56.

Summary judgment.

(a)
For claimant.
A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all
or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party.
A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment
is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or
any part thereof.
(c) Motion

and proceedings

thereon.

The motion, memoranda and

affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully

adjudicated

on motion.

If on motion under this

rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon
the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e)

Form of

affidavits

further

testimony;

defense

required.

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as

otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment,
if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
(f) When affidavits

are

unavailable.

Should it appear from the

affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the
party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may
make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits

made in

bad

faith.

If any of the affidavits

presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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Rule 59.

New trials; amendments of judgment.

(a) Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may
be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on
a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law
or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
j udgment:
(a) (1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(a) (2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the
jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special
verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one
of the jurors.
(a) (3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(a) (4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial.
(a) (5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(a) (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision, or that it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion.
A motion for a new trial shall be served not
later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits;
time for filing.
When the application for a new
trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall
be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The
opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve
opposing affidavits.
The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an
additional period not exceeding 2 0 days either by the court for
good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The
court may permit reply affidavits.

(d) On initiative
of court.
Not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court on its own initiative may order a new trial for
any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion
for a new party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
thereof.
(e) Motion to alter
or amend a judgment.
A motion to alter or
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after
entry of the judgment.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^

^

WESTSTAR EXPLORATION COMPANY,
INC. ,
RULING
Plaintiff,
vs.
COCHRANE RESOURCES, INC., ET AL.

CASE NO. 050800069
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on the following motions
for summary judgment: Defendant QEP' s "Motion for Summary Judgment," dated February 13, 2006; P&M's "Motion for Summary Judgment," dated February 27, 2006; Cochrane Resources' "Motion for
Summary Judgment," dated February 27, 2006; and Newfield's "Motion Summary Judgment," dated March 03, 2006. The Court will
address all of the motions for summary judgment in this one ruling. The Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to QEP's motion
was received March 20, 2006. the Plaintiff's other opposition
memoranda were filed March 21, 2006. Reply memoranda were filed
by: QEP on April 03, 2006; P&M on April 10, 2006; Cochrane Resources on April 10, 2006; and Newfield on April 06, 2006. On
July 12, 2006, the Court received oral argument in support of,
and in opposition to, these motions. The Court, having reviewed
the motions and the related memoranda, and having received a request for a decision, now rules upon the motions.
I. The Motions for Summary Judgment
The motions request that this Court grant summary judgment
against the Plaintiff thereby dismissing all of the Plaintiff's
claims against the Defendants pursuant to Rule 56 of Utah's
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Rules of Civil Procedure. The Defendants have presented several
different arguments that support their motions for summary judgment, however, this Court has only to consider one argument in
determining whether to grant or deny the motions: Does the
Plaintiff have a right to relief? The very core of any suit
brought into court is the right to relief. An individual cannot
maintain suit against someone for trespass when that individual
cannot establish ownership of the property in question. Proof of
ownership is prerequisite. In this case, the Court finds no indication of Plaintiff's ownership. The Plaintiff has been given
more than adequate time to produce evidence establishing his
ownership of the pipeline in question, but has failed to do so
even after repeated requests. It is for this reason that the
Court will order that the Plaintiff's claims be dismissed with
prejudice.
The Court notes that even if the Plaintiff were able to
prove some sort of ownership of the pipeline, evidence submitted
in the forms of affidavits and depositions go to show that the
Plaintiff, at best, has only partial ownership of the pipeline.
Supposing the Plaintiff were able to prove even partial ownership, the other putative co-owners of the pipeline should have
been joined in this suit pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Failure to join these parties could also be
grounds for dismissal, albeit without prejudice. However, because the Plaintiff has not proven any ownership of the pipeline
at all, this Court does not have to explore that avenue.
II. Claims for Indemnification
This suit contains multiple claims for indemnification. In
this case, indemnification would only result in the event of a
favorable ruling for the Plaintiff. Because the Court has determined that the Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery on its
causes of action, all claims related to indemnification are
mooted.
III. Defendant QEP's Claims
In addition to its claim for indemnification, Defendant QEP
has filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiff for attorney fees
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and filed a cross-claim for breach of contract against Defendant
P&M and Defendant Newfield.
A. Attorney Fees
QEP argues that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, it
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-56 states that the court shall award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party if the court determines the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. In
this case the court does not believe that the Plaintiff intentionally brought a case that was without merit nor does the
court believe that the case was not brought in good faith. It
is this Court's opinion that the Plaintiff truly believed that
it had a valid case, but was simply unable to provide the proof
necessary to prove its argument.
B. Breach of Contract
QEP's cross-claim against P&M and Newfield for breach of
contract is not before the Court at this time. For that reason,
QEP's cross-claim survives this ruling and will be adjudicated
at a later time.
IV. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, the Court will grant the Defendants' respective motions for summary judgment and will deny Defendant QEP's motion for attorney fees. The Court directs Defendant QEP to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and
submit it in accordance with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Dated this

day of

2006,

JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim
Plaintiff QEP Uinta Basin, Inc.

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WESTSTAR EXPLORATION COMPANY,
INC., a Nevada corporation,

ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Case No. 050800069
v.

Judge John R. Anderson

COCHRANE RESOURCES, INC., a Utah
corporation; P & M PETROLEUM
MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Colorado limited
liability company; NEWFIELD ROCKY
MOUNTAINS, INC., fka INLAND
RESOURCES, INC., a Delaware corporation;
QEP UINTA BASIN, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and JOHN DOES 1-5 and
MARY ROES 1-5, whose true names are
unknown,
Defendants.

On July 12, 2006, the Defendants brought on for hearing before the above-entitled court
their various Motions for Summary Judgment. William Gilmore appeared on behalf of the
Plaintiff with Plaintiffs counsel, Daniel Sam. Defendant QEP Uinta Basin, Inc. ("QEP") was

represented by its counsel, Jeff Oritt. Defendant Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc. fka Inland
Resources, Inc. ("Newfield") was represented by its counsel, Gayle F. McKeachnie. Defendants
Cochrane Resources, Inc. ("Cochrane") and P&M Petroleum Management, LLC ("P&M") were
represented by their counsel, Clark B. Allred. All Defendants filed Motions for Summary
Judgment. The Court, having read all memoranda supporting and opposing the Motions for
Summary Judgment, having heard oral argument from all the parties, having reviewed the related
memoranda and exhibits thereto, being fully advised in the premises herein, and good cause
appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs claims against all Defendants are dismissed, as a matter of law and with

prejudice, on the grounds that Plaintiff has produced to the court no evidence of ownership of the
pipeline in question, notwithstanding having had more than adequate time to produce said
evidence, and having failed to do so after repeated requests. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to
prove any right to the relief it seeks, as a matter of law.
2.

There are various cross-claims for indemnification among the Defendants.

Because such claims require a favorable ruling for the Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs claims are being
dismissed with this ruling, all such cross-claims related to indemnification (excepting QEP's
claims for attorneys' fees and costs against Newfield and P&M) are mooted.
3.

Defendant QEP's counterclaim against Plaintiff for attorney's fees pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953, as amended) is denied on the grounds that it is the
Court's opinion, based on the evidence before it, that Plaintiff truly believed that it had a valid
-2-

case, but was unable to provide the proof necessary to prove its argument. The Court finds that
Plaintiff did not intentionally bring a case that was without merit, and that the case was not
brought in bad faith. Accordingly, Defendant QEP's counterclaim for attorney's fees is
dismissed.
4.

Defendant QEP has pending cross-claims for damages and reimbursement of

attorneys' fees and costs against Defendants P&M and Newfield. In addition, Defendant
Newfield has a pending third party indemnification claim against RMOC Holdings, LLC on
Defendant QEP's claim. These claims are not before the Court at this time and accordingly
survive this ruling.
5.

Defendant Cochrane has pending third party claims against Washington Mutual

Bank and William Gilmore, which claims are not before the Court at this time and accordingly
survive this ruling.
6.

Defendants are entitled to an award of their reasonable costs incurred in this

action against Plaintiff, as the prevailing parties.
DATED this J / ^ d a y of August, 2006.

/O

/^Honorable John R. Anderson
Eighth District Court Judge
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WESTSTAR EXPLORATION COMPANY,
INC. ,

RULING ANr ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
COCHRANE RESOURCES, INC., et
al.,

CASE NO. 050800069
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration of Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants,
filed September 28, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum. The Defendants have each filed respective memoranda in opposition to the motion. The Plaintiff has filed reply memoranda
in support of the motion. Having reviewed the matter, and having received a notice to submit the motion for decision, the
Court now rules upon the motion.
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the
trial court discretion to revise pre-final-judgment orders. In
this case, the Court will refuse to exercise its discretion to
revise the order for the following reasons.
First, for all intents and purposes, the Court's order
granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment against the
Plaintiff was a final judgment on the Plaintiff's claims.
Second, the Court is not convinced that granting the Defendants' motions for summary judgment was in error. In this case,
the Plaintiff's only shred of evidence supporting ownership of

the pipeline was an assignment transferring whatever interests
Mr. Gilmore had in the Subject Pipeline to the Plaintiff. The
Court acknowledges that this document was before the Court for
consideration relating to the motions for summary judgment.
What was not before the Court, however, was any evidence regarding what interests Mr. Gilmore had in the subject pipeline prior
to that assignment. Mr. Gilmore baldly asserted that Gilmore
received title to the Pipeline from Bonanza by unrecorded assignment. Aff. William Gilmore, 53. At deposition on October
03, 2005, Mr. Gilmore testified that he had a copy of the unrecorded assignment from Bonanza to Gilmore and that he would produce a copy of that document. Production of tax documents indicating ownership were also promised at that time. None of these
documents were ever produced (even though all of them should
have been produced as part of initial disclosures). Repeated
requests for production of ownership documents were made by the
Defendants. Nothing was provided. Therefore, the only evidence
proffered on the issue of ownership was the assignment from Gilmore to Weststar. The Court, in granting the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, ruled that, as a matter of law, such
evidence did not establish a genuine issue of material fact. Tf
the Plaintiff feels that the decision was in error, the correct
course of action for the Plaintiff is not to file a motion for
reconsideration, but rather to file an appeal.
ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
Dated this

^ ^

day of sjppl^'

, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

OHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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10
1

A. No.

2

Q. When did that entity go out of business?

3

A. I would say in probably 1997.

4

Q. And again between this 1979 and now say 1979 time

5 period did you form any other business entities besides Gilmore
6
7
8
9

Oil and Gas?
A. I had a partnership I put together called Bonanza Gas
Company.
Q. And when did you put that together?

10

A. In the early 90' s.

11

Q. And where was that based?

12

A. Midland, Texas.

13

Q. And what was your title in that company?

14

A. Oh, owner I guess.

15

Q. I guess I should have asked and the earlier questions

16 would be is that partnership still in existence?
17

A. No.

18

Q. When did that go out of business?

19

A. It had been in existence since, I don't really remember

20 but it just kind of died. I am going to say probably in the
21 middle 90 ! s, 1997, 1998 possibly.
22

Q. And you said it was a partnership and were their

23 partners of yours?
24

A. There were yes.

25

Q. How many?

11
1

A

2

Q. And were those partners companies or individuals or

3

both?

4
^
6

Oh, there was probably seven or eight.

Both.
Q

Was

^t

a

iimited partnership such that you were the

general partner?

7

A

8

Q, What was the difference, if there wa s any

9

Yes.
:i n business

operations between Gilmore Oil and Gas and Bonanza Gas Company?

10

A. What was the difference?

11

Q. Yes, I mean you were operating both of them, at roughly

12 the same time so I am just wondering what the difference was,
13 if any, between those entities?
14

A. Well, Gilmore Oil and Gas was the operator of oil and

15 gas properties and wel In. and Bonanza Gas was the operator of
16 a natural gas pipeline.
17

Q. Okay. I will come back to that and again in this time

18 period between when you formed Gilmore Oil and Gas and Bonai iza
19 Gas Company and ended it, it sounds like both of them ended
20 roughly the same time 199 7 to -1998 is that : lot tin ie?
21

A. Roughly I would say.

22

Q. A ny other business entities that you formed and ran

23 during that time period this 1979 to 1997
24
25

•A

No.

Q. Okay. I want to just get these initial questions and

13
1 Gas and you said it was a operator of oil and gas wells.
2

A. Yes.

3

Q. You said it was a dba, were you the owner and principal

4

or head of Gilmore Oil and Gas?

5

A. Yes.

6

Q. Did you have any employees at any time?

7

A. Yes.

8

Q. Was it always a sole proprietorship throughout its

9

existence?

10

A. Yes.

11

Q. Where were the oil and gas wells that it operated?

12

A. Operated in Texas, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming and

13 Utah.
14

Q. And did Gilmore Oil and Gas own any of those oil and

15 gas wells as well as operate them?
16

A. Oh yes.

17

Q. Did it own all of them as well as operate them?

18

A. What do you mean did it own?

19

Q. Well, I am just wondering if Gilmore Oil and Gas was

20
21

the owner of all of the oil and gas wells it operated?
A. Well, if wasn't a hundred percent owner, it was a

22

certain working interest percentage ownership varying from

23

twenty-five to hundred percent.

24

Q. How about Bonanza where you said Bonanza was the

25

operator of a natural gas pipeline, first of all I guess the

14
1

question is where was that pipeline?

2
3

A. There was one in Prexus County, Texas and one in Uintah
County, Utah.

4

Q.

Ami

ii'ii thr-' on 12 y o u

31 J "? 1: r e f e r e n c e d

1,1 n U i n t a h

5

t h e one we a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n or a

6

one?

7
8

County

different

A. Well, we haven't described what we are talking about
y e t and if you want to describe it I will tell you.

9

Q

Sure, I will be 1 lappy to

In y our complaint you talk

10 about in paragraph seven you reference a natural gas pipeline
11

a

'asernent :i ii the Nor t:I :i. B o 11 a n z a F:it e ] c:i t o t:a 1 1 e 11 gth

12 approximately eight miles then you have various section, tract
13 and range identification numbers. Is that the one that you
14 are talking about?
15
16

Q

1 ijhl arid W e s t S t a i : Elxploi.atiun y o u s a i d thcit y o u

17 formed in in the year 2000. When you formed it, can you tell
18 m e who the officers were at that time?
19

A

I guess I held all the offices. William C. Gilmore.

20

Q

And did that change at. any time between when you formed

21

.ii. in the year 2 000 to tl: le present as far as who the officers

22 have been?
23

A. M o .

24

Q, Again the question going to when the corporation was

25

formed in 2 000 who were the directors at that time?

15
1

A. I was the sole director.

2

Q. And still today?

3

A. Yes.

4

Q. No other directors in the intervening five years?

5

A. No.

6

Q. And shareholders when you formed it?

7

A. Do I have to answer that?

8

MR. SAM: I think it is probably relevant.

9

MR. ORITT: I can give a little foundation that would

10 make Mr. Gilmore feel a little better about that.
11

THE WITNESS: I own all the shares, hundred percent.

12 BY MR. ORITT:
13

Q. When you formed it you owned hundred percent?

14

A. Yes.

15

Q. Has that stayed the same up through the present?

16

A. Yes.

17

Q. Where that comes from Mr. Gilmore just for your

18 interest in paragraph ten of your complaint you say you are the
19 president and controlling shareholder the plaintiff is WestStar
20 and that is where it comes from.
21

A. Yes.

22

Q. I meant to ask you going back to Bonanza Oil and Gas

23 you said that there were seven or eight other partners and I am
24 wondering if you can list for me those that you recall?
25

A. Marall Inc., Eddy Refining and several other

16
1 individuals.
2

Q. Do you remember any names?

3

A. Peter Wareing. Harry Phillips and a couple of others

4
5
6

and I dmi'l: remember who they are.
Q. As far as you know WestStar, still a Nevada Corporation
is that right?

7

A. Yes.

8

Q. It is in good standing?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q. And registered to do business in Utah?

11

A. Yes.

12

Q. Who is Donald Merritt?

13

A. Donald Merritt was a corporation nominee for WestStar

•14' ••'. whenever the paperwork "was initiated.
15

Q. He is not a director and does not hold any titles?

16

A.

17

Q. The reason I ask is that at least in the Utah

18 Department of Commerce web site he is listed as
19 President/secretary, treasurer and vice president.
20

A. Yes.

21

Q, But /hat is not correct?

22

A. Well, I think that the way this company that does the

23
24

corporation filings they use his name

.ominee.

Q, All right, you are listed as a director but nothing

25 other than that and that is why I asked.

33
1

A. Yes.

2

Q. Can I just now for ease of reference refer to it as the

3

pipeline that we will be talking about that eight mile pipeline

4

that is at issue in this litigation. If I call it the pipeline

5

would that be okay with you that is what we are talking about?

6

A . When I becomes not okay I will tell you.

7

Q. That is great that is all I can ask. So you say that

8

WestStar is the current owner of the pipeline and in my

9

interrogatories I asked what is the evidence of that, what is

10

the facts supporting that and you referenced documents

11

attached at Exhibit A. Well, Exhibit A to your answers were the

12

assignments that we just looked at, actually the only document.

13

So my first question is do you have any other

14

documentation in your files at your office or wherever you keep

15

files of the chronological history of the ownership of the

16

pipeline that is at issue in this litigation other than this

17

assignment of lease?

18

A. Yes.

19

Q. What are the source of documents you have?

20

A. I have an unrecorded assignment from Bonanza to William

21

C. Gilmore and an unrecorded assignment from William C. Gilmore

22

to WestStar.

23

Q. Lets start with the Bonanza one. Why is it unrecorded?

24

A. Just never got it recorded.

25

Q. And what does that assignment reference, what is being

1

assigned?

2

A. Reference to the pipeline.

3

Q. Just the pipeline not oil and gas leases?

4

A

Thai1 is correct.

The pipeline,, the right of-way and

5

whatever equipment that was associated with it. It describes

6

the pipeline as OTID type material, length, location.

7

Q

What is your recollection of the date of that

8

assignment?

9

.

05.

10

Q. Oh, the assignment from Bonanza.

11

A. Affective earlier and I can't remember what the date

12 is.
13

Q. So it is dated in this year but retroactive to some

14 : date?
15
16

:hat is right.
'

were to ask your attorney t :::> get n,s a copy of

17 that you would be able to get your hands on that at some point?
18

A

Yes.

19

Q. All right, so that is that unrecorded assignment and

20

similarly you said an unrecorded assignment from you to

21

WestStar?

22

A. Yes.

23

Q. Of the same pipeline right-of-way, etc?

24

A. Yes.

25

Q. Agaxn dated 2005 but retroactive?

85
1
2

A. It is my understanding that he took on all of the
obligations that I had.

3

Q. That Gilmore had?

4

A. Yes.

5

Q. Okay.

6

A. He was the operator. He stepped in my shoes and he was

7 by that I mean he was a custodian, if you will, and had full
8

care and custody of operations of all the properties which

9

included ten wells and six different oil and gas leases. He had

10 responsibilities that the operator had reporting to State and
11 Federal Government, producing the wells, keeping in compliance
12 with the regulations MMS and BLM regulations. Payment of
13 expenses incurred. Maybe I have said reporting to the parties
14 involved as far as expenses and production revenue reporting or
15 any unusual circumstances. There is a thousand things at lease
16 that a operator is responsible for doing and Mr. Allen had been
17 an operator for a number of years. It is my understanding that
18 he is a petroleum engineer and he operates properties nearby
19 here.
20

When he first started operating he operated a number of

21 wells in Cowley Basin Field which later was unitized and the
22 unit operator was Inland Production I think, Inland
23

something, Inland Resources, Inland Production or Inland

24

something. Under those circumstances he relinquished

25

operations on the wells he formally operated to the unit

1 operator. Outside of that, he had at least one. other well that
2

he operated nearby that was not in that unit. I believe it is

3

called the Federal 14-18 that he was the operator and had some

4

working interest in. That well too was a recipient of gas run

5

through this whole pipeline system and he is a beneficiary of

6

that as was the QEP Well but those two wells I don't think we

7

in units but I may be wrong about the QEP Well but I don't

8

think that well is in units kind of an outlying well in a unit.

9

Q. Okay. You listed several items that he was to operate,

10 did it include the pipeline that we are talking about in this
11

lawsuit?

12

A. Did what?

13

Q. His duties as operator include the pipel ine that we are

14 talking about in this lawsuit?
15

A. He is charged with the responsibility of producing

16 and selling the oil and gas from the properties.
17

Q. Are you telling me that his duties as operator

18 included that pipeline?
19

A. Well, he had a duty to sell the gas and produce and

20

sell gas which came along with the oil and that pipeline was

21

there and available for that and he did some of that is my

22 under s tanding.
23

Q. Is there a court order in this lawsuit in Texas that

24 appoints Cochrane as operator?
25

A. There was yes.

1

Q. Do you have a copy of that order?

2

A. Yes.

3

Q. Can you get that and provide that to Mr. Sam?

4

A. Yes.

5

Q. Is there an order ever releasing Cochrane as operator?

6

A . The order had a time limit on it.

7

Q. Do you know what that time limit was?

8

A. No.

9

Q. Do you know if that time limit has expired?

10

A. I am sure that it has. Excuse me and part of the

11

responsibilities and obligations of Ken Allen and Cochrane

12

Resources were to take care of the properties and he charged

13

some healthy fees to do so.

14

Q. Did he have an obligation to report to the court?

15

A. No, not to my knowledge.

16

Q. Did he provide reports to you?

17

A. Not what I requested.

18

Q. But did he provide reports to you and maybe not what

19

you requested but were you provided reports or other

20

information?

21
22
23

A. Well, I requested that he provide me with certain
information and he did not do so.
Q. My question was did he provide you information or some

24

kind or reporting that wasn't what you asked for but did h e

25

provide you stuff?

1

A. That is my recollection but it is beyond my legal

2

comprehension to answer that. I don't know. A lot of water

3

went under the bridge before this ever happened as it relates

4

to Mr. Cochrane or Mr. Ken Allen and Cochrane Resources.

5

Q. Before this was signed a lot did?

6

A. Yes.

7

Q. You organized WestStar Exploration sometime in the

8 year was it 2000?
9

A. Yes.

10

Q. Do you recall exactly when in 2000?

11

A. No.

12

Q. Can you get us the articles of incorporation showing

13

that?

14

A. Yes.

15

Q. Have you been the sole shareholder from the day of its

16

inception?

17

A. Yes.

18

Q. Now you talked a little bit about a company called

19 Bonanza Oil?
20

A. No, I didn't.

21

Q. Or Bonanza what did you call it, Bonanza Gas Company?

22

A. That is right.

23

Q. Now is that a partnership or a corporation?

24

A. Partnership.

25

Q. Is there some reason it is registered with the State

1

of Utah as a corporation?

2

A. It may have been.

3

Q. But it is your position it is a partnership?

4

A. Well, it was either a corporation and a partnership

5

or a partnership I don't remember.

6

Q. When was it organized?

7

A. In the early 9 0 f s .

8

Q. And what was your position with it?

9

A. Owner, president.

10

Q. I guess in the partnership you have been a partner

11

with others?

12

A. Yes.

13

Q. And you earlier said that there was seven or eight

14

others and you gave names of part of those?

15

A. Yes.

16

Q. The corporation then you would be a shareholder and.

17
18

the people you named would be the other shareholders?
A. No, there is never any shareholders. I don't

remember

19

if it was a corporation or not and maybe it was but if it w a s

20

Bonanza Gas I was the only owner in it.

21

Q. Well what were these other folks then?

22

A. The corporation may have been the general partner in

23

the partnership. I honestly don't remember.

24

Q. What ever happened to Bonanza Gas Company?

25

A. It just disappeared.

1

Q. What do you mean it disappeared?

2

A. It hasn't existed for a long time and nothing happened

3

about it and probably wasn't done properly wold be my guess .

4

Q. You just quit operating it?

5

A. Yes.

6

Q. Didn't do anything formally to dissolve i t ?

7

A. No.

8

Q. What was owned by Bonanza Gas Company?

9

A. Well, in Utah it owned this pipeline.

10

Q. Anything else?

11

A. It owns another pipeline in Texas.

12

Q. Then you said or I recall your testimony that there is

13 an unrecorded assignment from Bonanza Gas to you of this
14 pipeline?
15

A. That is right.

16

Q. And that happened in 2005?

17

A. Affective date was several years earlier than that.

18

Q. But you signed it in 2005?

19

A. That is right.

20

Q. How did we determine an affective date?

21

A. I don't recall how it was determined.

22

Q. Who determined it?

23

A. I did.

24

Q. You don't know how you determined it?

25

A. No.
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1

Q. Did you get any corporate authorization to transfer

2

that asset from Bonanza Gas to you?

3

A. Well, I guess I got it yes.

4

Q. Tell me what you got.

5

A. Just got it from me.

6

Q. You just decided to do it?

7

A. That is right. I didn't have any other stockholders.

8

Q. Did you pay Bonanza Gas anything for it?

9

A. I don't remember.

10

Q. It just happened within the year.

11

A.I

12

Q. So my understanding is that Bonanza Gas built the

don't remember.

13

pipeline and sometime in 2005 signed a document signing it to

14

you and then you signed it to Weststar?

15

A. That is right.

16

Q. And then you picked retroactive affective dates?

17

A. That is right. The paperwork should have been done

18

long ago.

19

Q. What is BLM's involvement with this pipeline?

20

A. Well, a lot of the right-of-way is on BLM surface and

21

the right-of-way application was reviewed and approved by

22

BLM and there are certain, I believe they are called rental

23

payments that are made periodically for the continuation o f

24

the right-of-way permits. They have over site any other matter

25

that would involve that line on their surface as to anything

1 money from me. He took all that revenue and it wasn't his. H-B
2

spent a hundred and thirty thousand dollars fixing up messes

3

that he caused he and/or his insurance company ought to be

4

paying for it not me.

5

Q. Anything else you claim that he did fraudulently?

6

A. No.

7

Q. You also claim that he acted illegally. Anything other

8

than what you have already told us to support your claim that

9

he acted illegally?

10

A. No.

11

Q. You also claim that he acted without authority.

12 Anything other than what you have told us that would show that
13 he acted without authority?
14

A. No. In his own handwriting he wrote a letter on a

15 yellow tablet paper said that he and the parties involved
16 decided to use this pipeline rather than let it sit. I am sure
17 you have a copy of that. I actually have the original so you
18 don't have the original, I have it.
19

Q. Okay, anything else?

20

A. Nothing that I know. I hope to find out more as we

21
22

take further depositions.
Q. During this entire time period he was acting under the

23 direction as operator under the direction of the court out of
24 Texas according to your testimony?
25

A. That is right.
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1 as far as he is concerned.
2

Q. You claim that he stole money from you?

3

A. Yes.

4

Q. Houston Exploration Company, do you own an interest

5

in that company?

6

A. No.

7

Q. It owns a half interest in this pipeline?

8

A. Yes.

9

Q. Does it also have a half interest in any damages to the

10 pipeline or use of the pipeline?
11

A. I hadn't thought about it.

12

Q. They probably are an essential party aren't they?

13

A. I think most of the damages incurred were prior to

14 their ownership of it and I think equitably if they are due any
15 money it would be any damages incurred after they acquired
16 ownership. I don't know exactly what our documents say about
17 that. At the time this was done I don't think I had any idea
18 about what was actually happening.
19

Q. As of March 1, 2004 now that is the affective date of

20 your agreement with or your assignment with Houston
21

Exploration?

22

A. I think that is right.

23

Q. As half owner of the pipeline that entity be entitled

24

to half of the damages if any after that date would that be

25

accurate?
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1 do with it?
2

A. I have some plans yes.

3

Q. What are those plans?

4

A. They are proprietary.

5

Q. What are those plans? I am not going to dance with you

6

and you can talk to your attorney but when I ask a question I

7

expect it to be answered okay.

8

A. The plans are for future use of it to market gas.

9

Q. From your Gilmore wells?

10

A. Maybe and maybe from other wells. These wells, maybe

11 my wells and maybe some one else's wells.
12

Q. Now we have talked about a Ted Collins, he is in these

13 lawsuits with you?
14^

A. That is right.

15

Q. And he is a part owner of what you call the Gilmore

16 Wells?
17

A. That is right.

18

Q. Does he have any ownership interest in the pipeline?

19

A. Yes.

20

Q. What is his ownership interest?

21

A. 8.33 percent.

22

Q. What about the Ware does he have an interest in the

23 pipeline too?
24

A. Same percentage.

25

Q. Do they still have that percentage ownership in the
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1 don't have a well out there.
2

Q. Okay.

3

A. That to me made me suspect and that was part of his

4

area and he probably ought to know and probably did know there

5 was a well out there and it was just fishy I thought.
6

Then his boy Mike Alexander in an effort to work out some

7

kind of agreement for Questar to use my line and transport gas

8

from newly drilled wells which I was in agreement to do. I want

9

to be a good neighbor, he indicated that there were gas

10 purchase agreements between Inland and Shenandoah and between
11 Questar and Shenandoah and I guess P&M never did have an
12 agreement with Questar. They may have assumed one but I don't
13 know. He told me they were there but he couldn't let me see
14 them. I don't know if they are there but I bet they are.
15

Q. Okay. I don't have any other questions right now.

16

EXAMINATION

17 BY MR. ALLRED:
18

Q. I have three little areas that I want to clarify and

19 make sure my notes are right on the ownership of the pipeline.
20 A guy named Ware and I guess it is an estate now owns 8.33
21

percent?

22

A. Yes.

23

Q. And Collins owns 8.33 percent?

24

A. Yes.

25

Q. And Houston Exploration has 50 percent under the
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1 document that we have

seon?

2

A. Yes.

3

Q. So that means WestStar owns forty three and a third

4

percent?

5

A. That is right.

6

MR. SAM: Can I interject something. I thought his

7 prior testimony was that Ware and Collins combined owned 8.33
8 percent but they each own 8.33 percent?
9

THE WITNESS: Yes.

10

MR. SAM: I am sorry.

11 BY MR. ALLRED:
12

Q. On the bankruptcy plan Gilmore and you I guess got the

13 properties out of the Chapter 11 subject to the debt of the
14 bank?
15

A. Yes.

16

Q. I think now I understand how that works. So that just

17 left the unsecured creditors sitting there and there was no
18 equity, nothing left, it just went through seven and discharged
19 them?
20

A. That is correct.

21

Q. You indicated that you talked to Ed Neibauer and Jerry

22 Cowley about the pipeline and they didn't ignore you did they?
23

A. Well, they didn't ignore me but they didn't continue

24 to use the pipeline.
25

Q. And didn't they negotiate back and forth with you about
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

QWEST CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS UTOPIA'S
COUNTERCLAIMS AND DENYING
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

UTAH TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPEN
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY, an
interlocal cooperative governmental agency;
the CITY OF RIVERTON, a Utah municipal
corporation; and TETRA TECH
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES INC., a
Colorado corporation,

Case No. 2:05-CV-00471 PGC

Defendants.

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Qwest Corporation claims that 47 U.S.C. § 253, the Federal
Telecommunications Act ("FTA"), preempts Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2) and Article XIII, §
3 of the Utah Constitution because they extend tax-exempt status to defendant UTOPIA and
thereby allow UTOPIA to offer telecommunications services at low prices. Defendant UTOPIA
has filed six counterclaims against Qwest. Five of these (numbers one through four and seven)
relate to Qwest's alleged failure to give UTOPIA access to its essential telecommunications
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infrastructure as the FTA and Utah's Public Telecommunications Law ("PTL") require. The
remaining counterclaim (number six) is a tort claim for alleged interference with economic
relations.
Qwest has moved to dismiss UTOPIA'S five statutory counterclaims (numbered one
through four and seven) that involve access to its infrastructure. It raises two separate arguments
in favor of dismissal: first, that UTOPIA fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
and second, that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these causes of action. The court
will address Qwest's subject matter jurisdiction arguments before its Rule 12(b)(6) arguments
because a Rule 12(b)(6) "disposition is a decision on the merits"1 that can be entered only by a
court with subject matter jurisdiction.2
Qwest has also filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to its trespass claim. The
court will address this motion after resolving the motion to dismiss.
I.

What Are UTOPIA'S Causes of Action?

To determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, the court must first discern which
statutes give rise to UTOPIA'S counterclaims. UTOPIA'S first four counterclaims allege that
Qwest's actions were "[c]ontrary to the provisions of the FTA" or "the provisions of the PTL"3
without stating which specific provisions Qwest allegedly violated. This court must therefore

x

Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 617 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186,200(1962)).
2

Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing
Frederiksen v. City ofLockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004)).
3

Doc. No. 4 7 , ^ 2 2 , 2 7 , 32, 38.
-2-
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determine the specific subsections of the FTA or PTL under which UTOPIA'S causes of action
arise.
Counterclaims one through four allege that UTOPIA, while constructing its network,
"requested access to certain of Qwest's essential facilities" and that "Qwest failed to permit
UTOPIA to have reasonable access to its essential facilities."4 Based on this language, Qwest
argues that UTOPIA'S counterclaims arise under 47 U.S.C. § 224, the Pole Attachment Act
("PAA"). The PAA requires the FCC to "regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole
attachments."5 Access to poles appears to be a "term" or "condition" subject to FCC regulation
under § 224(b); Qwest's argument thus appears to be correct.
But as Qwest further notes, one subsection of the PAA, 47 U.S.C. § 224(c), expressly
provides for state law preemption — that is, when a state chooses to regulate "with respect to
rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way," the state's
regulations preempt any equivalent FCC requirements.6 Utah has certified to the FCC that it has
enacted legislation and adopted regulations pursuant to § 224(c).7 Contrary to the position
asserted by UTOPIA, these regulations were in effect at all times relevant to this litigation. And
as the Utah Supreme Court noted, the broad language of § 224(c) means that "any regulation of

"See Doc. No. 47, HH 21-22, 26-27, 31-32, 37-38.
5

47 U.S.C. § 224(b).

6

/</.§ 224(c)(1).

States that Have Certified that They Regulate Pole Attachments, 1 F.C.C.R. 1498, 1498
(1992); see also Utah Cable Television Operators Ass 'n v. Pub. Serv. Comm 7J, 656 P.2d 398,
402 (Utah 1982).

-3-
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utility pole attachment contracts by a state, regardless of the nature or specificity of such
regulation, negates FCC jurisdiction over contracts in that state by providing a state forum for
complaints concerning such contracts."8 As such, Utah regulations — not FCC regulations —
govern disputes "with respect to rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits,
and rights-of-way," even though some pre-2006 Utah regulations specifically mention only pole
attachments by cable television companies.
In opposition, UTOPIA argues that its counterclaims are "not based specifically on § 224
but upon the Federal Telecommunications Act as a whole."9 UTOPIA cites no case law in
support of this proposition — that a private party may enforce "the entire FTA" or that the FTA
"as a whole" creates an implied right of action. Rather, UTOPIA cites 47 U.S.C. §§ 206-07 and
251, and claims that these sections, read in light of § 224, create private rights of action.
The court cannot accept UTOPIA'S argument. The few cases the court found that deal
with this issue hold that § 251 does not create a private right of action.10 Most courts to address
the issue have also held that § 207 does not create a private right of action for violations of the

%

Utah Cable Television Operators Ass 'n, 656 P.2d at 400.

9

Doc. 81,at6n.4.

™AT&T Communications ofCal, Inc v. Pacific Bell, 60 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1002 (N.D. Cal.
1999).

-4-
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.11 In short, the great weight of authority demonstrates that
there is no private right of action for violations of the 1996 Act.
Accordingly, the court agrees with Qwest and holds that UTOPIA'S first four
counterclaims are pole attachment claims that arise under the PTL — the preemptive provisions
of Utah law.
II.

Does This Court Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction over UTOPIA'S First
Four Counterclaims?

Now that court has determined UTOPIA'S first four counterclaims arise under the PTL,
the court must next address whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. The court
holds that it does not have jurisdiction.
Under the PTL, "a dispute over interconnection of essential facilities . . . or the planning
or provisioning of facilities or unbundled elements" should be brought "to the [Utah Public
Service] commission, and the commission, by order, shall resolve the dispute on an expedited
basis."12 Utah law requires parties to "'exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a
prerequisite to seeking judicial review.'"13 There is no dispute that UTOPIA filed its
counterclaims without first seeking redress from the PSC as Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-2.2(l)(e)
11

See Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 173 F.
Supp. 2d 1282, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2000); see also Global Naps, Inc v. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey,
Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 532, 544 n.17 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing cases). But see Conboy v. AT&T Corp.,
84 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (S.D.N. Y. 2000) (finding that a private right of action exists based on
"Sections 206 and 207 of the Telecommunications Act for damages suffered as a result of a
violation of the Act").
12

Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-2.2(l)(e).

"Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 44 P.3d 724, 727 (Utah 2002) (quoting Nebeker v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 34 P.3d 180, 184 (Utah 2001)).

-5-
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provides. Because "this precondition to suit" was not satisfied, this court "lack[s] subject matter
jurisdiction."14
UTOPIA argues that it need not exhaust its administrative remedies. It claims that the
PSC lacks jurisdiction over it because UTOPIA is a municipal corporation. This argument is not
well founded. The issue is whether the PSC has jurisdiction over Qwest so that it may adjudicate
any grievances against Qwest. During the hearing on this motion, all parties admitted that the
PSC has such jurisdiction; a plain reading of the PSC's jurisdictional statute, Utah Code Ann. §
54-4-1, shows that admission was correct. UTOPIA has not pointed to any statute that would
exempt it from the requirement of submitting its disputes with Qwest — a party over whom the
PSC has jurisdiction — to that administrative body.
Whether the PSC has jurisdiction to adjudicate Qwest-initiated proceedings against
UTOPIA is another question that the court need not reach. The plain language of Utah Code
Ann. § 54-8b-2.2(l)(e) requires UTOPIA, "one . . . of the disputing parties" in this
interconnection melee, to "bring the dispute" against Qwest "to the commission" so that "the
commission, by order," may "resolve the dispute on an expedited basis."
UTOPIA also appears to argue that the PSC lacks jurisdiction over it as a complaining
party because it is a municipal corporation. This argument is based on the so-called "ripper
clause" of the Utah Constitution, which provides: "The legislature shall not delegate to any

A

Id.
-6-
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special commission .. . any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal
improvement, money, property or effects . . . or to perform any municipal function."15
On its face, this clause does not appear to apply here. If UTOPIA were to initiate
proceedings against Qwest before the PSC for Qwest's failure to provide access to facilities, the
commission's decision would not be "interfering] with any municipal improvement, money,
property or effects," but with Qwest's "improvements, money, property, or effects."
If this clause does apply, however, two elements must be met before it would deprive the
PSC of jurisdiction over UTOPIA as a complaining party: first, the PSC must be a "special
commission"; and second, UTOPIA must be performing a "municipal function." The Utah
Supreme Court has held that the PSC is a special commission for Ripper Clause purposes,16 thus
satisfying the first element. But based on the 1990 Utah Supreme Court case of Utah Associated
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, UTOPIA cannot prove that it is
performing a "municipal function."
In UAMPS, the Utah Supreme Court set forth this "balancing approach to decide whether
any particular activity is a 'municipal function.'"17 Courts must consider factors such as
the relative abilities of the state an municipal governments to perform the
function, the degree to which the performance of the function affects the interests
of those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the extent to which the
legislation under attack will intrude upon the ability of the people within the

15

Utah Const, art. VI, §28.

]6

Utah Assoc. Mun. Power Sys. v. Pub. Serv. Comm % 789 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1990).

11

Id. at 302 (quotation marks omitted).
-7-
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municipality to control through their elected officials the substantive policies that
affect them uniquely.18
Based on these factors, the UAMPS court held that an effort by a consortium of municipalities to
build a power transmission line was not a "municipal function."19 UAMPS was "a political
subdivision of the state that combine[d] more than twenty cities, towns, and local agencies for
the purpose of generating, buying, and selling electricity across the state."20 Its construction of a
power line was "sufficiently infused with a state, as opposed to an exclusively local, interest to
escape characterization as a municipal function."21 And "the very fact" that so many
municipalities banded together to form UAMPS went "a long way to demonstrate that the
function is one beyond the ability of any local government entity to perform effectively."22
The only real difference the court can see between the facts in UAMPS and those here is
that UTOPIA is building a telecommunications network rather than a power transmission line.
Otherwise, the discussion in UAMPS is applicable in all material respects to this case. The court
therefore holds that UTOPIA is not performing a "municipal function" within the meaning of
article VI, § 28 of the Utah Constitution by constructing its telecommunications infrastructure.
The "ripper clause" therefore does not preclude the PSC from exercising jurisdiction over
UTOPIA, which must present its pole attachment claims to the PSC before bringing suit. In light

n

Id.

l9

Id.

2

Hd.

21

Id. at 303 (brackets and quotation marks omitted).

22

Id.
-8-
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of this conclusion, the court need not reach any of Qwest's other arguments, including its
argument that UTOPIA cannot claim sovereign immunity under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
III.

UTOPIA'S Seventh Counterclaim Must Also Be Dismissed.

UTOPIA'S final counterclaim (mislabeled number 7) alleges that Qwest breached an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In full, this cause of action reads:
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

UTOPIA incorporates all preceding paragraphs herein.
Qwest is required to permit UTOPIA to have reasonable access to its
essential facilities.
Such required access includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
Contrary to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Qwest has
not provided UTOPIA reasonable access to its essential facilities.
As a direct and proximate result of Qwest's conduct, UTOPIA has
suffered an undetermined amount of damages which damages shall be
proven at trial.23

In moving to dismiss this claim, Qwest argues that UTOPIA has not shown any contract
that would create an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. UTOPIA responded by stating
that "[s]uch implied covenant obviously is a part of a contract and therefore the existence of such
contract is implicit in the allegation."24 While the existence of a contract may be implicit in its
allegation, UTOPIA stops short of alleging the existence of an explicit contract that gives rise to
the alleged duty. Instead, it claims that the FTA and PTL "granted statutory contract third-party
beneficiary status upon UTOPIA because such legislative acts clearly intended to confer a

Doc. No. 47, at 20.
Doc. 81, at 12.
-9-

Case 2:05-cv-00471-PGC

Document 124

Filed 07/18/2006

Page 10 of 13

separate and distinct benefit on UTOPIA (47 U.S.C. § 251) and a means to enforce such benefit
(47 U.S.C. § 206-207)."25
The court finds no precedential support for UTOPIA'S claim. UTOPIA did not cite, and
the court has not found, any case that says § 251 creates a "statutory contract" to which any
interested party may claim a "third-party beneficiary" status. This is an especially difficult
argument for UTOPIA to make because, as noted above, § 251 does not even create an implied
private right of action.26 UTOPIA'S seventh counterclaim therefore should be dismissed.
One final question remains: should the dismissal be under Rule 12(b)(6) and therefore on
the merits, or under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction? Arguably, the court
should dismiss for failure to state a claim because of the apparent lack of support for UTOPIA'S
position. But the language of this claim — alleging a failure to provide "reasonable access to
[Qwest's] essential facilities" — is so related to conduct governed by Utah's PTL that the court
holds it arises under the PTL just like UTOPIA'S first four counterclaims. As such, this claim,
like the others, must be adjudicated before the PSC, an entity better suited to determining
whether Utah's regulatory scheme creates an "implied duty of good faith and fair dealing." The
court therefore dismisses this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

25

Id.

2(i

AT&T Communications ofCai, Inc. v. Pacific Bell, 60 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1002 (N.D. Cal.

1999).
-10-
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Qwest's Fourth Cause of Action Will Be Dismissed Because of Qwest's
Admissions.

In its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment, Qwest admitted that its fourth
claim "is premised on UTOPIA'S violation of state and local laws and applicable industry
standards" and "invokes the expertise and ongoing regulatory function of the commission."27
Qwest also "agree[d] that this claim should be dismissed."28 The court therefore dismisses
Qwest's fourth cause of action.
V.

Disputed Issues of Material Fact Preclude the Entry of Partial Summary
Judgment.

Qwest also has moved for summary judgment on its trespass claims. It alleges that
UTOPIA has attached to Qwest's poles without permission and has removed Qwest's facilities
from poles of unknown or disputed ownership. Qwest asks the court to find as a matter of law
that UTOPIA trespassed; this finding, it claims, should facilitate settlement of its pending tort
claims.
The standard governing summary judgment motions should be familiar. The court may
only enter summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact."29 "' A fact is "material" if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the

Doc. #111, at 4.
'Id.
'Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
-11-
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outcome of the lawsuit.'"30 This court must "view the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."31
In this case, the court finds that UTOPIA (and Tetra Tech, its subcontractor) have
presented evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to who owned some of the
poles at the time the alleged trespass occurred. Since trespass requires proof of ownership,32
disputed issues of fact on this point preclude summary judgment at this time.
CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS Qwest's motion to dismiss (# 67) and DISMISSES UTOPIA'S first
through fourth and seventh counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It also
DISMISSES Qwest's fourth cause of action for the same reason. These claims all relate to "pole
attachments" and, under Utah's regulatory framework, must first be resolved by the PSC before
they may be heard in court.

30

Terra Venture, Inc. v. JDNReal Estate Overland Park, L.P., 443 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Sports Unlimited, Inc. v. Lankfor Enters., Inc., 275 F.3d 996, 999 (10th Cir.
2002)).
3]

Id. (quotation marks omitted).

32

See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (citing John
Price Assoc, Inc. v. Utah State Conf, Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214
(Utah 1980)).
-12-
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And disputed issues of material fact require the court to DENY Qwest's motion for
summary judgment (# 98).
SO ORDERED.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

Qi QJ

Paul G. Cassell
United States District Judge
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United States Department of the Interior
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
Vernal Field Office
170 South 500 East
Vernal, UT 84078
(435) 781-4400 Fax: (435) 781-4410
http://www.blrn.gov/utah/vernal

TAKE PRIDE"

'AMERICA

IN REPLY REFER TO

3162.3
UT08300
June 8, 2004
William Gilmore
Weststar Exploration Company
811 Rusk, Suite 708
Houston, Texas 77002
Re:

Well No. Federal 34 No. 1
NWNW, Sec. 34, T8S, R24E
Uintah County, Utah
Lease No. UTU-52767

Dear Mr. Gilmore:
This correspondence is in regard to the self-certification statement submitted requesting a
change in operator for the referenced well. After a review by this office, the change in operator
request is approved. Effective immediately, Weststar Exploration Co. is responsible for all
operations performed on the referenced well. All liability will now fall under your bond, BLM
Bond No. UTB000101, for all operations conducted on the referenced well on the leased land.
Our records show that a right-of-way, UTU-65139, has been issued for the off lease portion of
the pipeline to the subject well. In order for Weststar Exploration Co. to obtain the Bureau of
Land Management's approval for the use of this right-of-way, you must have this right-of-way
assigned over to Weststar Exploration Co. Please contact Cindy McKee at 435-781 -4434 for
instructions on how to complete the assignment of the right-of-way.
If you have any other questions concerning this matter, please contact Leslie Walker of this
office at (435) 781-4497.
Sincerely,

Howard B. CleavingeM
Assistant Field Manager
Minerals Resources
cc:

UDOGM
Ted Collins Jr.
Herbert W. Ware Jr.

bcc:

Well file
Reading file
Lands

U-924

United States Department of the Interior
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
Vernal Field Office
170 South 500 East
Vernal, UT 84078
(435) 781-4400 Fax: (435) 781-4410

TAKE PRIC

•NUMERIC

IN REPLY REFER TO.

2880/2880
UTU-65131 et al
(U-084)

MAR 1 3 2006

DECISION
Assignee:
Weststar Exploration Co.
811 Rusk, #708
Houston, Texas 77002

Rights-of-Way
UTU-65131, UTU-65163
UTU-65158, UTU-65139

Assignor:
Gilmore Oil & Gas
115 N Marieneld #155
Midland, Texas 79701
Bonanza Gas Company
110 N. Marienfeld 155
Midlan, Texas 79701
Assignment of Ricrhts-of-Way Approved
On February 13, 2006, Weststar Exploration Company filed an
assignment in connection with Federal rights-of-way UTU65131, UTU-65163, UTU-65158, and UTU-65139.
The assignment conveys 100 percent interest in the subject
rights-of-way from Bonanza Gas Company and Gilmore Oil & Gas
to Weststar Exploration Company
It has been determined that the applicant has met the
requirements of 43 CFR s2807.21 and 2887.11, therefore, the
assignment are hereby approved, subject to the terms and
conditions of the original grants, any conditions of
approval attached to the APDs and/or SNs, and the applicable
regulations under 43 CFR 2800 and 2880.
The assignments listed above do not require the preparation
of an environmental assessment or environmental impact
statement as it has been found to not individually or

cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment. The applicable Categorical Exclusion reference
is in 516 DM 11.5 E.9. This references states, Renewals and
assignments of leases, permits or rights-of-way where no
additional rights are conveyed beyond those granted by the
original authorizations.
Copies of serial register pages have been enclosed for your
information and records.
Please contact Cindy McKee of our office at (435) 781-4434
if you need additional information concerning this right-ofway.

Robert M. Specht
Branch Chief, Lands & Minerals
Enclosures:
As State

cc: Well Files (33-1, og lease UTU-58725, 26-1 og lease UTU52765, 1-27 og lease UTU-54928, 27-2, 27-3 og lease UTU52765, 34-1 & 34-2 og lease UTU-52767
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